1 Th e tendency has been apparent in recent Finnish scholarship on the issue of Finland's involvement in the brutalized war in the east; cf., as the most densely argued example, Oula Silvennoinen, Salaiset aseveljet: Suomen ja Saksan turvallisuuspoliisiyhteistyö 1933-1944 (Helsinki, 2008; for a comprehensive overview of the debate see CHAPTER TWO
It sometimes serves the historian well to begin at the end, if only for the sake of illustrating a point more forcefully (and all too obviously with the historian's luxury of hindsight): when Nazi Germany's relationships with its central allies on the Eastern Front, Finland and Romania, collapsed in the late summer of 1944, the actual dismantling of the bilateral aff airs could hardly have been more diff erent. While the German minister to Helsinki, the conservative career diplomat Wipert von Blücher, and his military counterpart at the Finnish High Command, liaison general Waldemar Erfurth, were courteously escorted out of the country, Germany's chief diplomatic representative in Bucharest, the former Freikorps leader and Nazi politician Manfred von Killinger, committed suicide against the backdrop of an escalating military confrontation between German and Romanian forces, which rapidly descended into one of the most bitterly fought campaigns of World War II's fi nal stages.
My subsequent remarks will argue that this apparent dissimilarity is already foreshadowed by Berlin's relations with Helsinki compared to those with Bucharest in the preceding years, virtually right from the outset of Hitler's coalition-building eff orts in 1940-41. By occasional, though by no means systematic comparative reference to Romania, I will take up and reconsider the case for Finnish exceptionalism during World War II-a case which has recently come under rather heavy and sustained fi re in both Finnish and international historiography, so much so that some tend to regard it as eff ectively buried. 
